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1 Introduction
In Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (BGS 2012a), we described a new approach to choice
under risk that we called salience theory. In comparisons of risky lotteries, we argued,
individuals’ attention is drawn to those payoffs which are most different or salient relative to
the average. In making choices, individuals overweight these salient payoffs relative to their
objective probabilities. A simple formalization of such salience-based probability weighting
provides an intuitive account of a variety of puzzling evidence in decision theory, such as
Allais paradoxes and preference reversals.
Salience theory naturally lends itself to the analysis of the demand for risky assets. After
all, risky assets are lotteries evaluated in a context described by the alternative investments
available in the market. An asset’s salient payoff is naturally defined as one most different
from the average market payoff in a given state of the world. We present a simple model
of investor choice and market equilibrium in which salience influences the demand for risky
assets. This model accounts for several time series and cross-sectional puzzles in finance in
an intuitive way, based on its key implication that extreme payoffs receive disproportionate
weight in the market valuation of assets.
We focus on four well known puzzles. First, salient thinking leads to a preference for assets
characterized by the possibility of high, salient payoffs that are overweighted by investors.
∗Bordalo: Royal Holloway, University of London. Gennaioli: Universita´ Bocconi. Shleifer: Harvard
University. We are grateful to Nicholas Barberis, John Campbell, Robin Greenwood, Alp Simsek, Josh
Schwartzstein, and Jeremy Stein for extremely helpful comments.
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One type of such assets are those exhibiting positive skeweness. Barberis (2013) summarizes
considerable evidence that investors in fact overvalue such assets. Second, our theory helps
explain the growth-value puzzle: growth stocks are overpriced in the market because they
have large salient upsides, while value stocks are underpriced because they have salient
downsides such as bankruptcy. Third, the model delivers a preference for safe assets over
risky ones because, under the diminishing sensitivity property of salience introduced in BGS
(2012a), investors focus on downside risks more than on equal-sized upside risks, leading
to an undervaluation of risky assets. The model thus generates an equity premium (Mehra
and Prescott 1985). Fourth, our theory predicts counter-cyclical variation in aggregate stock
market returns. In bad times, the risky asset’s downside relative to the safe asset is salient,
and hence the risky asset is underpriced. Conversely, in good times its upside is salient,
leading to overvaluation and low expected returns. The logic of time varying expected
returns is captured naturally in our model, because all we need is that investors focus on
payoffs that are extreme relative to the safe asset.
Our model shares some predictions with approaches to asset pricing based on Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), such as Barberis and Huang (2008) and Barberis,
Huang and Santos (2001). We compare the two approaches after presenting the model.
2 Asset Payoffs and Salience Weighting
There are two periods t = 0, 1 and a measure 1 of identical investors. Each investor has a
linear utility function defined over consumption (c0, c1) in the two periods. Risk aversion
plays no role in our analysis, and neither does time discounting. At t = 0, each investor
receives an endowment w0 of the consumption good, as well as one unit of each one of the
J > 1 available assets j = 1, .., J . At t = 1, there are S states of nature s = 1, ..., S, each
occurring with probability pis, with
∑S
s=1 pis = 1. Asset j pays dividend xjs in state s ∈ S
at t = 1.
Take a generic asset j. The salience of its payoff xjs depends on how xjs compares to the
average market payoff xs =
∑
j xjs/J delivered by all the available assets in the same state
s. Salience is thus defined within the “narrow frame” of objective asset payoffs, and does
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not depend on investor-specific attributes such as own portfolio or wealth. Specifically, the
salience function σ (xjs, xs) satisfies two properties: i) ordering: if interval [x, y] is contained
in a larger interval [x′, y′], then σ (x, y) < σ (x′, y′); ii) diminishing sensitivity: for all x, y > 0
and any  > 0, σ (x, y) > σ (x+ , y + ). Following BGS (2012b), we balance these two
properties by using a salience function that is symmetric and homogenous of degree zero:
σ (αx, αy) = σ (x, y) for any α > 0, with σ(0, 0) = 0. This implies that salience is an
increasing function of the percentage difference between x and y, consistent with Weber’s
law. An example of a salience function satisfying these properties is σ(x, y) = |x−y|/(x+y),
where x, y > 0.
The payoff xjs that asset j pays in state s is more salient than the payoff xjs′ it pays
in state s′ if and only if σ (xjs, xs) > σ (xjs′ , xs′). Denote by rjs the salience ranking of
xjs, which ranges from 1 (most salient) to S (least salient). In his valuation of asset j, the
investor weights payoff xjs by ωjs = δ
rjs/
∑
s′ pis′δ
rjs′ . Here δ ∈ (0, 1] captures the degree to
which the investor neglects non salient payoffs. If δ = 1, the weight ωjs is equal to 1 for all
s. This is the case of a rational investor. If instead δ < 1, the investor overweights salient
payoffs at the expense of the non salient ones.
If an investor trades an amount αj of each asset j, his expected utility at t = 0 is:(
w0 −
∑
j
αj · pj
)
+
∑
s
pis
(∑
j
(αj + 1) · ωjs · xjs
)
. (1)
The first term in (1) is the first period consumption, which equals the investor’s wealth
minus the expenditure on assets. The second term in (1) is the expected value of the
salience-weighted portfolio return (where αj + 1 is the endowment of asset j plus any extra
amount bought or sold by the investor).
As in the Lucas (1978) tree model, an equilibrium consists of: i) optimal buying decisions
αj by all investors, which come from maximising (1), and ii) market equilibrium αj = 0, for
all j. The first order condition combined with market equilibrium yields the price of each
asset j:
pj = E [ωjs · xjs] = E [xjs] + cov [ωjs, xjs] . (2)
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The price of asset j is equal to the expected value of its future payoff xjs plus the
covariance between payoffs and salience weights. If δ = 1, there are no salience distortions,
namely ωjs = 1 for all xjs. In this case, cov[ωjs, xjs] = 0 and the price of each asset j is
its expected payoff E [xjs], the rational price. Since investors are risk neutral and do not
discount the future, each risky asset yields a return equal to the interest rate of 1.
When δ < 1, each asset j commands a risk premium equal to − cov[ωjs, xjs]. When the
lowest payoffs of an asset are the salient ones, namely cov[ωjs, xjs] < 0, the investor focuses
on downside risks and demands a positive risk premium. When the highest payoffs are the
salient ones, namely cov[ωjs, xjs] > 0, the investor focuses on the asset’s upside potential
and the risk premium is negative.
Equation (2) has several implications. First, if the asset’s payoffs are proportional to
those on the market portfolio, its price is “rational.” An asset is misvalued only to the
extent that it delivers unusually salient payoffs in some states. Formally, when xjs = λ · xs,
with λ > 0 for all states s, all states are equally salient, ωjs = 1, and cov[ωjs, xjs] = 0.
Second, although in equilibrium the investor holds the market portfolio, prices depend
on each asset’s idiosyncratic risk. To see this clearly, suppose that there is no aggregate
risk, namely xs = x in all states s. Any asset j then commands a risk premium due to
idiosyncratic differences between its payoff xjs and the market payoff x. This phenomenon
arises from a type of “narrow framing”: salience is shaped by the payoffs of individual assets,
not by the investor’s portfolio. When thinking about buying an extra share of Facebook
stock, investors focus on the billion users and potential extraordinary profits, and not on its
impact on the payoff of the overall portfolio.
Third, an investor’s willingness to pay for an asset is context dependent. Holding constant
the payoff distribution of an asset j, the investor’s willingness to pay for it depends on the
payoff distribution of the market (xs)s∈S, and not (just) on the investor’s own portfolio.
Changes in background context affect the salience of an asset’s payoffs and thus its price.
The implication that idiosyncratic risk affects security valuations is consistent with a
good deal of empirical evidence (Barberis 2013, Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink 2010). The
intuition is straightforward and plausible: investors think about individual assets, focus on
their upsides and downsides, and value them according to what draws their attention. The
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next question is exactly what this implies for cross-sectional patterns of asset pricing.
3 Taste for Skewness and the Growth-Value Puzzle
Suppose that there are three states of nature, s = 1, 2, 3, and that the market has no
aggregate risk, so that its payoff is xs = x in all states. Asset j delivers a high payoff,
xj1 = x+G, in state 1, the market payoff xj2 = x in state 2, and a low payoff xj3 = x−L in
state 3. For simplicity, assume that pi1G = pi3L. The expected payoff of the asset, and thus
its rational price, is then equal to pj = x.
For our investor, the salience of xjs depends on how this payoff compares to the market
payoff x. The upside is more salient than the downside when σ (x+G, x) > σ (x− L, x).
From homogeneity of degree zero of the salience function σ, this holds if and only if (x +
G)(x− L) > x2, or
G >
L
1− L/x (3)
The upside of asset j is likely to be salient if j features a large gain G (with a low probability)
and a small loss L (with a high probability) relative to its average payoff x. Keeping x fixed,
condition (3) holds provided G is sufficiently higher than L. As the level of all payoffs x
rises, diminishing sensitivity becomes weaker and the salience of payoffs is determined by
the ordering property. In the limit, if G > L the investor focuses on the asset’s upside.
The salience ranking pins down the payoff weights ωj1, ωj2, ωj3. Given these weights,
and under the assumption that pi1G = pi3L, the price of the asset is given by:
pj = x+ pi1G · [ωj1 − ωj3] . (4)
Whether salient thinking causes the asset to be over- or under-priced relative to its
rational value x depends on whether condition (3) holds. When (3) holds, the high payoff
x+G is salient, ωj1 > ωj3, and the asset is over-priced: investors overweight the opportunity
of obtaining the high payoff x + G. When condition (3) is violated, the asset’s low payoff
x− L is salient. Now ωj3 > ωj1 and the asset is under-priced. Investors overweight the risk
of obtaining the low payoff x− L.
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This mechanism provides insight into the well-known empirical finding (Fama and French
1992, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994) that value stocks - those with low stock mar-
ket prices relative to measures of “fundamentals” such as assets or earnings - earn higher
average returns than growth stocks - those with high market prices relative to measures of
fundamentals. In our model, asset j fits the description of a “value stock” if it delivers a
small upside G with high probability pi1 and a big downside L, such as bankruptcy, with a
low probability pi3 (recall that pi1G = pi3L). In this case, condition (3) does not hold. As
a consequence, the investor magnifies the downside risk of the value stock, ωj3 > ωj1, so
that by Equation (4) the asset is underpriced. Alternatively, asset j is a “growth stock”
if it yields a big upside G with a low probability pi1 and a small downside L with a high
probability pi3. In this case, if condition (3) holds, the investor thinks of the growth stock as
an opportunity to obtain a large windfall, partly neglecting the fact that the growth stock
has a sizeable objective probability of a low payoff. From Equation (4) such an asset is
overpriced. In sum, in our model growth stocks are overvalued because, in contrast to value
stocks, they have the possibility of delivering a very high payoff (becoming the next Google).
In focusing on the role of payoffs (as opposed to probabilities), condition (3) differs from (in
fact is stronger than) positive skewness.
This implication of the model is consistent with the empirical evidence we already men-
tioned, but it goes further. Fama and French (1992) conjecture that value stocks earn higher
average returns because they are disproportionately exposed to a separate risk factor, which
they call distress risk. Subsequent research, however, failed to find evidence that value stocks
are particularly risky. Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) find that stocks of companies
vulnerable to the risk of bankruptcy if anything earn lower average returns, contrary to the
Fama-French view that “value” reflects bankruptcy risk. In our model, value stocks are not
fundamentally riskier, but the possibility of their bankruptcy is salient to investors, causing
undervaluation. In contrast, growth stocks may themselves have a high risk of bankruptcy,
but it is their greater upside that attracts investors’ attention, causing overvaluation. The
model thus puts together the Fama-French intuition that investors fear bankruptcy of value
stocks with the observation that this possibility is salient and thus exaggerated.
More generally, this example shows that the extent to which certain asset payoffs “stand
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out” relative to the market may cause – through salience – distortions in the perception
of asset specific risks and thus in asset prices, for instance helping to explain why right-
skewed assets tend to be overvalued. Barberis (2013) reviews a large body of evidence, from
individual stocks to IPOs, pointing to an overpricing of right skewed assets in markets.
Since salience depends on the market context, our model also predicts that the overpricing
of growth stocks should vary with market conditions. Holding constant the prospects of an
individual right-skewed asset, improvements in market conditions should reduce its over-
pricing relative to other assets in the market.
4 Time Varying Risk Premia
To analyze the implications of our model for time varying risk premia, suppose there are
only two assets in the market (J = 2): a risk free asset F with constant payoff f , and a
risky asset that delivers a high payoff, xj1 = x + G, in state 1 that occurs with probability
pi, and a lower payoff xj2 = x in state 2 that occurs with probability 1− pi. The sure payoff
lies between the highest and lowest risky payoff, namely x < f < x+G.
The average market payoff is then equal to x1 = (x+G+f)/2 in state 1 and x2 = (x+f)/2
in state 2, so that the market displays aggregate risk. In this context, we can think of “good
times” as x being high, potentially close to f . Bad times are defined as low x. The variance
of the risky asset’s payoffs does not depend on the times, i.e. does not depend on x. We also
consider what happens if good times are defined by pi being large.
The safe asset is priced at f , so it provides a return equal to the interest rate of 1. In a
rational world, the risky asset is priced at p = x+piG. Since the investor is risk neutral, the
price changes one for one with x, and the asset again yields a return of 1.
With salient thinking, the investor perceives the risky asset’s downside to be salient when
x+G
(x+G+ f) /2
<
(x+ f) /2
x
, (5)
and its upside as salient otherwise. Condition (5) says that the downside is salient when the
risky asset’s loss relative to the safe asset is proportionally larger than its gain. Given a
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salience ranking, the price of the risky asset is then given by:
p = x+ ω1piG. (6)
By comparing p with the fundamental price x+piG, we see that the risky asset is underpriced
(the risk premium is positive) when its downside is salient, because in this case ω1 = δ/(piδ+
[1 − pi]) < 1. In contrast, the risky asset is overpriced (the risk premium is negative) when
its upside is salient, because in this case ω1 = 1/(pi + [1− pi]δ) > 1.
Equation (6) implies that the risk premium (1− ω1) piG is countercyclical: it decreases
in the average payoff x. This is because salience switches as market conditions change.
When the fundamentals x of the risky asset deteriorate, its upside x + G gets closer to the
safe payoff f . This makes the downside of the risky asset salient, triggering a positive risk
premium. When instead the fundamentals x of the risky asset improve, its downside x gets
closer to the safe payoff f . In this case, the risky asset’s upside becomes salient, and the risk
premium turns negative.
The role of market movements in affecting, though salience, the risks that investors
attend to can help shed new light on the observed countercyclical variation in risk premia
(Campbell and Shiller 1988). When fundamentals are good, investors focus on the upside of
future payoffs, and overvalue the market. When fundamentals are poor, investors focus on
the downside of future payoffs, and undervalue the market.
Equation (6) also implies that investors overreact to news about salient payoffs and
underreact to news about non-salient payoffs. Suppose that the risky asset’s upside is salient
so that the risk premium is negative, ω1 > 1. Then an increase in the risky asset’s upside
G causes a disproportionate increase in its price, and thus a reduction in the risk premium.
Similarly, if the probability of the asset’s salient upside is small, pi <
√
δ/(1+
√
δ), the investor
overreacts to news about pi, and good news (increase in pi) leads to a further reduction in
the risk premium.
This example is readily extended to include many risky assets. Since most risky assets
are not sufficiently right skewed relative to the market, their downsides are salient, by the
diminishing sensitivity property of salience. This leads to an overall under-valuation of the
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market, an equity premium (Mehra and Prescott 1985).1 Still, since the available right
skewed stocks are more likely to be overvalued in good times, the model generates, in the
aggregate, a counter-cyclical (positive) risk premium.
5 Conclusion
We conclude by comparing our paper to the work based on Prospect Theory. Barberis
and Huang (2008) study the implications of probability weighting for the cross section of
stock returns. They show that overweighting small probabilities associated with extreme
events leads to the pricing of idiosyncratic skewness. In our model, extreme payoffs are
overweighted not because they have small probabilities but because they are salient relative
to the market payoff. This has two implications. First, in our model the relevant notion of
positive skewness is not defined in isolation, but relative to alternative investments. Second,
in our model investors over-react to changes in the probability of salient payoffs, even if these
payoffs have sizeable probabilities.
These features allow us to naturally account for time varying risk premia. It is harder
for Prospect Theory’s standard probability weighting function to do so, unless it is assumed
that during booms individual assets become more positively skewed. In a recession, when
the objective probability of left tail payoffs increases, standard probability weighting would
imply that the low payoff will be less over-weighted than before. Similarly, when the objective
probability of right tail payoffs decreases, the high payoff will be more over-weighted than
before. This suggests that risk aversion should increase in good times and decrease in bad
times, which appears counterfactual.
To address these problems, models using Prospect Theory rely on its other features to
explain the evidence, particularly loss aversion and time-varying reference points. Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) show that loss averse investors require a large premium to hold equity.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) extend this argument to a dynamic setting, in which
recent gains or losses are only slowly incorporated into an investor’s reference point, leading
1Because the price of the market portfolio equals the sum of the prices of the individual assets composing
it, the market is undervalued, namely there is an equity premium, if and only if the assets are on average
undervalued. From Equation (2) this holds when
∑
j covs [ωjs, xjs] < 0.
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to shifts in his risk aversion, so that in good times the investor expects, and receives, a
lower premium. In contrast, our model predicts that the equity premium is driven not by
preferences but by the salience of market payoffs: in good times the investor perceives the
risky assets to be better than they really are. As a consequence, investors’ expectations of
payoffs are themselves cyclical.
In sum, our model can account for the basic cross-sectional and time-series puzzles in asset
pricing using one simple idea that an investor focuses on salient payoffs of an asset, which
are those that stand out from the average (market portfolio that includes the riskless asset).
As a consequence, assets with large upsides are overpriced. Assets with large downsides are
underpriced. The model yields several new implications, and can be extended to concave
utility and to more dynamic environments. We leave this to future work.
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